Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games by Amiet, Ben et al.
PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA AND BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN
RANDOM GAMES
BEN AMIET, ANDREA COLLEVECCHIO, AND MARCO SCARSINI
Abstract. In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may
fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the
payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large number
of players can each choose one of two possible actions, and the payoffs are i.i.d. with
the possibility of ties. We provide asymptotic results about the random number of pure
Nash equilibria, such as fast growth and a central limit theorem, with bounds for the
approximation error. Moreover, by using a new link between percolation models and
game theory, we describe in detail the geometry of Nash equilibria and show that, when
the probability of ties is small, a best-response dynamics reaches a Nash equilibrium
with a probability that quickly approaches one as the number of players grows. We
show that a multitude of phase transitions depend only on a single parameter of the
model, that is, the probability of having ties.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background and motivation. A pure equilibrium in a game is a profile of actions
(one for each player) such that, given the choice of the other players, no player has an
incentive to make a different choice. In other words, deviations from an equilibrium
are not profitable for any player. This concept of equilibrium, although quite simple
and powerful, has the drawback that not every game admits pure equilibria. John Nash’s
major contribution was to introduce the more general concept of mixed equilibrium, and to
show that—in a game with a finite number of players and actions—the existence of mixed
equilibria is guaranteed (Nash, 1951, 1950). A mixed action of a player is a probability
distribution over their action set. When mixed actions are allowed, the choice criterion is
the expected payoff with respect to the product of the mixed actions. As before, a mixed
equilibrium is a profile of mixed actions that does not allow profitable deviations.
Although the definition and properties of mixed actions and mixed equilibria are clear,
their interpretation is far from unanimous. Section 3.2 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994),
dedicated to the interpretation of mixed equilibria, has paragraphs individually signed
by each of the two authors, since they could not reach an agreement. In general, pure
equilibria have a stronger epistemic foundation than mixed equilibria. As mentioned
before, the main problem of pure equilibria is existence.
Some authors have tried to frame this problem in a stochastic way: given a set of
players and a set of actions for each player, if payoffs are drawn at random, what is
the probability that the game admits pure Nash equilibria? More precisely, what is the
distribution of the number of pure Nash equilibria in a game with random payoffs? The
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answer to this question clearly depends on the way random payoffs are drawn. In any
case, for a fixed number of players and actions, the answer is computationally daunting.
For this reason some papers have chosen to investigate the problem from an asymptotic
viewpoint; that is, they have looked at the limit distribution of the number of pure Nash
equilibria as the number of either actions or players goes to infinity.
The basic common assumption of much of this literature is that the distribution of the
random payoffs is nonatomic and payoff profiles are independent. Under these hypotheses,
the probability that two payoffs coincide is zero and, as a consequence, calculations are
significantly simplified.
It is well-known that Nash equilibria are hard to compute (Daskalakis et al., 2009).
One way to address the issue is to devise iterative procedures that converge to a Nash
equilibrium. One very natural adaptive procedure is best-response dynamics (BRD) (see,
e.g., Roughgarden (2016, chapter 16)): starting from an action profile, a single player is
picked at random and allowed to choose a different action. This player will choose one of
the most profitable actions among all alternative actions with a strictly higher payoff. If
no such action exists, the player will not move and a different player is chosen at random.
When a new action profile is reached, the process is repeated. If we reach a profile
for which no player has a profitable deviation, then the process has reached a pure Nash
equilibrium. The question is whether, starting from any action profile, a pure equilibrium
is reached. In general the answer is negative: first, because a game may fail to have pure
equilibria; second, due to the fact that even when pure equilibria exist, players may be
trapped in a subset of vertices that does not contain a pure Nash equilibrium. One way to
determine the severity of this failure to reach a pure Nash equilibrium via best-response
dynamics is to examine games with random payoffs.
1.2. Our contribution. In the present paper we consider games where the number N
of players is large, each player has two actions, and payoffs are random. The main
novelty of our approach is to show the strict relation between three different topics—
games with random payoffs, best-response dynamics, and percolation—and to provide
analytic results, rather than simulations. In games with random payoffs, a significant
part of the existing literature has focused on the number of pure Nash equilibrium. Here
we extend this analysis, but we also connect it to the behavior of best-response dynamics
and provide results that concern not only the number of pure equilibria, but also how
easily they can be reached via best-response dynamics. The main tool for this analysis is
a suitable correspondence between a random directed graph that represents our random
game and a suitable percolation graph.
A main feature of the present work is that we dispense with the assumption of nonatomic
distribution of the payoffs and therefore allow ties to exist. We show that the probability
of ties plays a crucial role in many ways. For example, it determines the asymptotic
distribution of the number of pure Nash equilibria. Moreover, we establish a novel con-
nection with percolation theory on the hypercube. We use tools from percolation theory
to describe the geometry of the set of pure Nash equilibria, which also depends on the
probability of ties. This description permits to analyze the performance of best-response
dynamics. This has been extensively done in the literature for the class of potential
games. In our paper we can show that, asymptotically in the number of players, with
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high probability best-response dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium, if the
probability of ties is small (less than 0.55).
As mentioned before, the probability of ties in the payoffs, which we call α, is the funda-
mental parameter in this model. Different values of α produce different possible behaviors
in the number of pure Nash equilibria as well as in their correlation structure. We will
show that, for as long as α is positive, the game has many pure equilibria with very high
probability, and best-response dynamics converges to one of them (Theorems 4.3 and 4.4
below). Moreover, if α is strictly less than 1/2, then all pure Nash equilibria are reachable
with high probability via best-response dynamics from any deterministic starting point.
Conversely, some of them are unreachable when α is at least 1/2. Furthermore, when
α is positive, Theorem 3.2 shows a concentration of the number of pure Nash equilibria
around (1 + α)N and establishes a central limit theorem, using the Chen-Stein method,
as developed in Chatterjee (2008).
To illustrate this phenomenon, we plot in Fig. 1 the case where Z takes only the
values {−1, 1} with equal probability (notice that α = 0.5 in this context). The average
number of pure Nash equilibria exactly fits the curve (1.5)N , confirming our prediction.
Moreover, we are able to quantify the fluctuations (see Theorem 3.2) which are of
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Figure 1. Number of NE for 2 ≤ N ≤ 15, α = 0.5, with 100 trials per
N . Diamond markers represent average number per value of N , and the
curve (1.5)N is included for comparison.
the order (1 + α)N/2. Finally, the number of pure Nash equilibria, properly rescaled,
rapidly converges to a standard normal (see Fig. 2), with speed of convergence of the
order (1+α)−N/4. We emphasize that our results depend on the payoff distributions only
through the parameter α, and remain applicable even when the payoff distributions vary
among players.
1.3. Related work. As mentioned before, several papers have considered aspects related
to the number of pure equilibria in games with random payoffs. In many of the papers
that we consider below, the random payoffs are i.i.d. from a continuous distribution.
Unless otherwise stated, this is the assumption that governs the results of the following
papers.
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Figure 2. CLT result for N = 15, α = 0.9, with 500 trials.
Goldman (1957) considered zero-sum two-person games and showed that the probabil-
ity of having a pure equilibrium goes to zero as the number of actions grows. He also
briefly mentioned the case of payoffs with a Bernoulli distribution. Goldberg et al. (1968)
considered general two-person games and showed that the probability of having at least
one pure equilibrium converges to 1 − e−1 as the number of actions diverges. Dresher
(1970) generalized this result to the case of an arbitrary finite number of players.
More recent papers have looked at the asymptotic distribution of the number of pure
equilibria. Powers (1990) showed that, when the number of actions of at least two players
goes to infinity, the distribution of the number of pure Nash equilibria goes to a Poisson(1).
She then compared the case of continuous and discontinuous distributions.
Stanford (1995) derived an exact formula for the distribution of pure Nash equilibria in
random games and obtained the result in Powers (1990) as a corollary. Stanford (1996)
dealt with the case of two-person symmetric games and obtained Poisson convergence for
the number of both symmetric and asymmetric pure Nash equilibria.
In all the above models, the expected number of pure Nash equilibria is in fact 1. Under
different hypotheses, this expected number diverges. For instance, Stanford (1997, 1999)
showed that this is the case for games with vector payoffs and for games of common
interest, respectively. In Stanford (1999) both strictly and weakly ordinal preferences
were studied.
Rinott and Scarsini (2000) weakened the hypothesis of i.i.d. payoffs, that is, they
assumed that payoff vectors corresponding to different action profiles are i.i.d., but they
allowed some dependence within the same payoff vector. In this setting, they proved
asymptotic results when either the number of players or the number of actions diverges.
More precisely, if each payoff vector has a multinormal exchangeable distribution with
correlation coefficient ρ, then the following hold: for ρ negative the number of pure Nash
equilibria goes to zero in probability; for ρ = 0 it converges to a Poisson(1), and; for ρ
positive, it diverges and a central limit theorem holds.
Takahashi (2008) considered the distribution of the number of pure equilibria in a
random game with two players, conditionally on the game having nondecreasing best-
response functions. This assumption greatly increases the expected number of pure Nash
equilibria. Daskalakis et al. (2011) extended the framework of games with random payoffs
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to graphical games. Action profiles are vertices of a graph and players’ actions are binary,
like in our model. Moreover, their payoff depends only on their action and the actions of
their neighbors. The authors studied how the structure of the graph affects existence of
pure Nash equilibria and they examined both deterministic and random graphs.
The issue of solution concepts in games with random payoffs has been explored by
various authors in different directions. For instance, Cohen (1998) studied the probability
that a Nash equilibrium (pure and mixed) in a finite random game maximizes the sum of
the players’ payoffs. Pei and Takahashi (2019) devoted their attention to rationalizable
strategies in two-person games with random payoffs and performed an asymptotic analysis
in the number of actions.
Finding a Nash equilibrium in a game is PPAD-complete (Daskalakis et al. (2009)).
Therefore, given this computational difficulty, several learning procedures have been pro-
posed to reach an equilibrium by playing the game over and over. (see, e.g., Blum and
Mansour (2007), Tardos and Vazirani (2007)). Probably the simplest such procedure is
best-response dynamics. The main problem that arises is that best-response dynamics
is guaranteed to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium only when the game is of some
specific type, such as, for instance, a potential game (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) or
a weakly acyclic game (Fabrikant et al. (2013)). The performance of BRD in randomly
drawn potential games has been studied in Coucheney et al. (2014), Durand et al. (2019),
Durand and Gaujal (2016). To be able to deal also with games for which BRD does not
converge to a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), Goemans et al. (2005) defined the concept
of sink equilibrium. A sink equilibrium is simply a fully connected set of two or more
vertices with no edges leading out of the set. If players are selected at random and asked
to choose a best response, the game will eventually reach a sink equilibrium and wander
on its components. Christodoulou et al. (2012) considered a similar model, focusing on
the rate of convergence to approximate solutions of the game. Du¨tting and Kesselheim
(2017) considered best-response dynamics in the context of combinatorial auctions.
The idea of generating games at random to check properties of learning procedures
was used by Galla and Farmer (2013) and, more recently, by Pangallo et al. (2019),
who studied—mainly through simulations—the behavior of various learning procedures
in games whose payoffs are drawn at random from a multinormal distribution.
Some of our results are proved by using variations of the Chen-Stein methods (see,
Chen (1975), Stein (1972)). In particular, we use a result of Chatterjee (2008). Another
key tool in our analysis is provided by percolation theory, introduced by Broadbent and
Hammersley (1957). Since then, the theory developed very quickly and became very
important both in the mathematics and the physics communities. For a general account
on percolation, see Grimmett (1999). We will focus on percolation on the hypercube, and
will use classical results by Erdo˝s and Spencer (1979) and Bolloba´s (2001), as well as a
more recent result by McDiarmid et al. (2018).
1.4. Organization of the paper. Section 2 introduces some notation and basic defi-
nitions. Section 3 deals with the number of pure Nash equilibrium in a random game.
Section 4 studies the behavior of best-response dynamics in these games. The interaction
between games with random payoffs and percolation is expounded in Section 5. Section 6
contains the proofs.
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2. Notation
We first introduce some notation that will be adopted throughout the paper. We
consider a game
ΓN =
(
[N ], (Si)i∈[N ], (gi)i∈[N ]
)
, (2.1)
where [N ] := {1, . . . , N} is the set of players and Si is the set of actions of each player
i ∈ [N ]. We set S = ×i∈[N ]Si, and we let gi : S → R be the payoff function of player i.
For each s = (s1, . . . , sN) ∈ S, we call s−i the action profile of all players except i.
Definition 2.1. An action profile s∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the game ΓN
if for all i ∈ [N ] and for all si ∈ Si we have
gi(s
∗) ≥ gi(si, s∗−i). (2.2)
An action profile s∗ is a strict pure Nash equilibrium (SPNE) if for all i ∈ [N ] and for
all si ∈ Si we have
gi(s
∗) > gi(si, s∗−i). (2.3)
We will refer to the set of PNE by NN .
In what follows, we will assume that all players have the same binary action set, i.e.,
Si = {0, 1} for each i ∈ [N ].
Two action profiles s, t are neighbors if one can be obtained from the other by changing
the action of exactly one player, i.e.,
si 6= ti for some i ∈ [N ] and sj = tj for all j 6= i. (2.4)
In this case we write s ∼i t. Moreover, we write s ∼ t if s ∼i t for some i ∈ [N ].
We now associate to our game the graph HN = (VN ,EN), where the set of vertices is
the set of action profiles, i.e., VN = S, and two vertices s, t are connected by an edge in
EN iff they are neighbors in the sense of Eq. (2.4). We call HN an N-cube. For each pair
s, t of neighbors, call [s, t] the edge connecting them. This representation has been used
by Candogan et al. (2011) for general finite games with an arbitrary number of actions
for each player.
In the rest of the paper we will be interested in asymptotic results. For this purpose
the following definition will be useful.
Definition 2.2. A sequence of events (Ak)k is said to hold with high probability (WHP)
if
lim
k→∞
P(Ak) = 1. (2.5)
A sequence of events (Ak)k is said to hold with very high probability (WVHP) if
∞∑
k=1
(1− P(Ak)) <∞. (2.6)
Notice that ‘with very high probability’ is much stronger than ‘with high probability’.
In fact, it implies, in virtue of the first Borel–Cantelli lemma, that there exists a random
N such that Ak is true for all k ≥ N .
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3. Number of pure Nash equilibria and strict pure Nash equilibria
Our goal is to examine some generic properties of games with binary actions and a
large number of players. To do this, we assume that the payoffs of our game are drawn
at random. In particular, for each s ∈ S, the payoff gi(s) is the realization of a random
variable Zsi and the random variables (Z
s
i )i∈[N ],s∈S are i.i.d.. Denote by Z a generic
independent copy of Zsi . We will look at asymptotic results in the number of players.
Several results exist in the literature about the distribution of the number of PNE.
When the distribution of Z has no atoms, with probability 1, the number of PNE coincides
with the number of SPNE. This is not the case when atoms are present. Our first result
deals with this issue.
We define
α := P(Z1 = Z2), β := P(Z1 < Z2) =
1− α
2
, (3.1)
where Z1 and Z2 are i.i.d. copies of Z.
As we will see, all the results in the paper will depend on α. Most of the existing
literature deals with the case α = 0. Our extension to the general case has relevant
implications.
Theorem 3.1. If α = 0, then, as N →∞, the number of SPNE converges in distribution
to a Poisson(1). If α > 0, then the number of SPNE is 0 WVHP.
Remark 3.1. As mentioned before, when α = 0, the number of PNE and of SPNE
are almost surely equal. In this case, convergence of the number of PNE to a Poisson
distribution as the number of players increases was proved by Arratia et al. (1989), Rinott
and Scarsini (2000) for any fixed number of actions.
It is interesting to note that, whenever atoms are present, the numbers of PNE and of
SPNE have radically different behavior. This fact will be better described in Theorems 3.2
and 4.3 below.
We have seen that, when the law of Z has atoms, the number of SPNE vanishes
asymptotically, while the number of PNE diverges. Moreover, in this case, a version of
the central limit theorem holds. Call Φ the cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal random variable:
Φ(x) :=
∫ x
−∞
1√
2pi
e−u
2/2 du. (3.2)
Theorem 3.2. Assume that the law of Z has atoms, i.e., α > 0. Then there exists a
constant Kα > 0, which depends only on α, such that
sup
x
∣∣∣∣P( |NN | − (1 + α)N(1 + α)N/2 ≤ x
)
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Kα
(1 + α)
1
4
N
. (3.3)
The interesting feature of Theorem 3.2 is that, besides showing convergence in distri-
bution of the number of pure Nash equilibria to a normal distribution, it also provides a
bound for the approximation error, in the spirit of Chen (1975), Stein (1972). A related
result was obtained by Rinott and Scarsini (2000), who showed that the number of PNE
diverges and a central limit theorem holds when the joint distribution of payoffs within
the same profile has positive correlation.
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Remark 3.2. Notice that Theorem 3.2 implies that the number of Nash Equilibria grows
geometrically when α > 0. More precisely, we can show that, for any ε > 0 small enough,
Eq. (3.3) implies that WVHP
|NN | > (1 + α)N − (1 + ε)N(1 + α)N/2. (3.4)
Fix ε > 0 such that
(1 + ε) < (1 + α)1/2.
With this choice of ε, the right-hand side of Eq. (3.4) is (1 + α)N(1 + o(1)). Hence,
by establishing Eq. (3.4) we would prove that the number of Nash Equilibria grows like
(1+α)N . Choose xN = −(1+ε)N . Recall the standard inequality Φ(−x) ≤ φ(x)/x, valid
for x > 0, where φ is the density of a standard normal. We then have that
Φ(xN) ≤ C(1 + ε)−N
for some constant C > 0.
∞∑
N=1
P
(|NN | ≤ (1 + α)N − (1 + ε)N(1 + α)N/2)
=
∞∑
N=1
(
P(|NN | ≤ (1 + α)N − (1 + ε)N(1 + α)N/2)− Φ(xN)
)
+
∞∑
N=1
Φ(xN)
≤
∞∑
N=1
Kα
(1 + α)
1
4
N
+
∞∑
N=1
C
(1 + ε)N
<∞.
4. Improvements and best-response dynamics
Once it is proved that our large binary game has many equilibria, it becomes interesting
to study their geometry in the hypercube HN . In particular, we will be interested in
evaluating the probability of reaching a PNE starting from a generic strategy profile and
moving from one profile to another via payoff improvement, as described below.
Definition 4.1. Given a strategy profile s ∈ HN , the profile t ∼i s is a profitable
deviation for player i if
gi(t) > gi(s). (4.1)
in which case the difference gi(t)− gi(s) is called the improvement of player i.
An improvement path is a sequence of strategy profiles s0, s1, . . . such that each sk+1
is a profitable deviation of sk for some player ik.
If an improvement path stops, it is because it has reached a PNE. An improvement
path may never stop, either because the game does not have PNE or because it gets
trapped in some region.
In the case of games with two actions for each player, a BRD is just a random im-
provement path. In what follows, we study the probability that the BRD reaches a PNE
in a random game. Again, we will see that the role of atoms in the distribution of Z is
fundamental.
Starting with the N -cube HN = (VN ,EN), we obtain a new partially oriented graph−→
H N = (VN ,
−→
E N) where some of the edges are assigned a random orientation by the
following process. Let s ∼i t; then the directed edge
−−→
[s, t] from s towards t is in
−→
E N if
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and only if Zsi < Z
t
i . If the law of Z is nonatomic, then the probability that two payoffs
coincide is zero. Therefore,
−→
H N is just a random orientation of HN , where each edge
is independently oriented in one direction or the other with probability 1/2. If, on the
other hand, the law of Z has atoms, then P(Zsi = Z
t
i ) > 0, so with positive probability,
some edges have no orientation.
Definition 4.2. We say that t is directly accessible from s if the directed edge
−−→
[s, t] ∈ −→E N .
We say that t is accessible from s if there exists a finite sequence s0, s1, . . . , sk such that
s = s0, t = sk and, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, we have
−−−−−→
[si, si+1] ∈ −→E N .
Hence, t is directly accessible from s if t is a profitable deviation from s for some
player i and t is accessible from s if we can go from s to t along an improvement path.
Definition 4.2 has a natural interpretation in terms of BRD. Suppose a BRD is initiated
from s. Then t is accessible from s if and only if there is a positive probability that the
BRD reaches it.
An example with three players is given in Fig. 3. The orientation of the edges is
induced by the payoffs in the table below. The absence of ties produces a complete
orientation of the hypercube. The green edges are the possible paths of a BRD starting
at the vertex (1, 1, 1). The two vertices in red, i.e., (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 0), are the two pure
Nash equilibria of the game. Either of these vertices can be reached via a BRD starting
from any initial vertex. Theorem 4.4 below proves that, with very high probability, this
is always the case, when the number of players is large and α is small enough.
Player 3 - Strategy 0
Player 1
Player 2
0 1
0 (0.542, 0.709, 0.426) (0.209, 0.659, 0.569)
1 (0.292, 0.684, 0.126) (0.815, 0.774, 0.508)
Player 3 -Strategy 1
Player 1
Player 2
0 1
0 (0.202, 0.549, 0.174) (0.199, 0.097, 0.319)
1 (0.110, 0.567, 0.794) (0.949, 0.530, 0.055)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0)
(1, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 1)
(1, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
Figure 3. Representation of Γ3 on {0, 1}3.
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Our next result shows the existence of a sharp phase transition in the accessibility of
PNE. Roughly speaking, as the mass of the atoms in the distribution of Z grows, so does
the number of PNE, though some may not be accessible from some profile s. Hence, in
this case, some PNE may not be reachable via BRD. Fix s ∈ VN and partition
VN = L
s
N ∪˙M sN (4.2)
in such a way thatL sN is the set that contains s as well as all vertices t that are accessible
from s in the oriented graph
−→
H N .
Theorem 4.3. Let α be defined as in Eq. (3.1). Fix s ∈HN .
(a) If 0 ≤ α < 1/2, then
lim
N→∞
P(NN ⊂ L sN) = 1.
(b) If α = 1/2, then
lim
N→∞
P(|NN ∩M sN | > 0) > 0.
(c) If α > 1/2, then, for any K > 0,
lim
N→∞
P(|NN ∩M sN | > K) = 1.
The interpretation of Theorem 4.3 is that, for any fixed s, asymptotically,
(a) for 0 ≤ α < 1/2, every PNE is potentially reachable by the BRD starting at s, WHP;
(b) for α = 1/2, with positive probability there exist PNE that are not reachable by the
BRD starting at s;
(c) for α > 1/2, the number of PNE that are not reachable by the BRD starting at s
grows to infinity, WHP.
Therefore, we have an interesting phase transition at α = 1/2.
To complete the picture, we give a result about the convergence of BRD to some PNE.
The following theorem shows that BRD converges to a PNE, WVHP if α ≤ 0.55. This
rules out the possibility for the BRD be trapped in a cycle, when α is small.
Theorem 4.4. If α > 0 satisfies⌊
− 1
ln (1/2 + α/2)
⌋
≤ 3, (4.3)
i.e., if α ∈ (0, 0.55], then for any fixed starting profile s, the BRD converges to a PNE,
WVHP.
Remark 4.1. To summarize our results: Theorem 3.2 proves that the number of PNE
grows geometrically when α > 0 (see Remark 3.2). Theorem 4.3 describes the set of
PNE and proves that, when α is larger than a certain threshold, some of them are not
accessible. Theorem 4.4 instead establishes that, when α is small enough, the BRD
converges to some PNE and does not get trapped in a region not containing any PNE.
Example 4.1. To clarify the role of α, assume that Z ∼ Poisson(θ). Then
α =
∞∑
k=0
e−2θ θk
(k!)2
= e−2θ I0(2θ), (4.4)
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where I0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1965,
9.6.12, p. 375). The graph of this function is given in Fig. 4. The larger θ, the smaller
the probability of ties and all values of α can be covered. The critical value α = 1/2
corresponds to θ = 0.617705.
Figure 4. α as a function of θ.
5. Percolation
Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 concerning the geometry of the set of pure Nash equilibria will
be proved using a connection with percolation theory that is interesting in itself, as it
creates an important bridge between disciplines. For this reason, we choose to discuss
this link here, even though the percolation will be used later on, when proving the the-
orems of Section 4. This application shows an interesting use of tools from probability,
combinatorics and graph theory in the context of game theory and opens the way for a
fruitful interplay.
Fix a starting action profile s, i.e., a vertex of the hypercube, and consider the cluster of
edges that can be traversed by a BRD starting from s. For example see the green cluster
in Fig. 3, relative to s = (1, 1, 1). In general, we will show that this cluster has the same
distribution as an independent bond percolation cluster containing s. The parameter of
the percolation is uniquely determined by α.
5.1. Bond percolation. Independent bond percolation onHN is defined as follows. For
each edge in HN , flip a coin having probability β of showing heads. If the toss shows
heads, then declare the edge to be open; otherwise the edge is closed. The subgraph
obtained fromHN by deleting the closed edges is a random graphH
β
N , called percolation,
that includes all vertices in VN , but could be disconnected. This model allows us to give
a detailed description of the geometry of the PNE.
Random subsets U1,U2 with values in VN are said to have the same distribution if
P(U1 = A) = P(U2 = A) for all A ⊂ VN . (5.1)
We consider the following three random sets:
(a) L βN is the largest component of the percolation H
β
N ,
(b) L β,sN is the largest component containing the vertex s in H
β
N ;
(c) L sN is the set of vertices that are accessible from s in the BRD in
−→
H N .
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The next two propositions show the relations between these three sets. In particular,
Proposition 5.1 proves that L βN and L
β,s
N coincide WVHP for large values of N . The
proof of this result will use Borel-Cantelli’s lemma. Proposition 5.2 shows that, for every
N , L sN and L
β,s
N are equal in distribution. The proof of this result will be achieved
through a suitable coupling.
Proposition 5.1. For any fixed s ∈ VN and β > 0, WVHP we have
L βN = L
β,s
N . (5.2)
Proposition 5.2. Let β be defined as in Eq. (3.1). For any profile s the random sets
L sN and L
β,s
N have the same distribution.
The next result focuses on the nonatomic case, that is, β = 1/2, i.e., α = 0. This
corresponds to the classical bond percolation with parameter 1/2. As mentioned above,
a vertex is called isolated if it has degree zero in the graph induced by the percolation.
Erdo˝s and Spencer (1979) analyzed the asymptotic behavior ofH βN when β = 1/2, and
showed that the random graph is connected WHP. A further inspection of their proof
reveals that WHP the largest connected component of this percolation contains all the
vertices in VN with the exception of some ‘isolated’ vertices, i.e., vertices with degree 0
in H βN .
Proposition 5.3 (Erdo˝s and Spencer (1979, page 35)). WHP the largest connected com-
ponent of H 1/2N contains all the vertices, with the exception of some isolated vertices, i.e.
vertices with degree 0 in the induced subgraph. Let ΞN be the set of isolated vertices. As
N →∞, the distribution of ΞN converges to a Poisson(1).
6. Proofs
Proofs of Section 3.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. When α = 0, convergence of the number of PNE to a Poisson(1)
was proved by Arratia et al. (1989), Rinott and Scarsini (2000). Moreover, since almost
surely no two payoffs are equal, we have that each PNE is also an SPNE.
Next, we focus on the case α > 0 and prove that the number of SPNE is zero, WVHP.
Notice that α > 0 implies that β < 1/2. For any s ∈ VN , define
W s :=
{
1 if s is an SPNE,
0 otherwise.
(6.1)
Notice that E[W s] = βN . If we call WN the total number of SPNE in the game, we have
WN =
∑
s∈VN
W s. (6.2)
Therefore, E[WN ] = (2β)
N . Markov’s inequality implies
P(WN ≥ 1) ≤ E[WN ]. (6.3)
Since 2β < 1, the upper bound goes to zero geometrically fast. 
Denote by h the Hamming distance on HN :
h(s, t) = #{i : si 6= ti}. (6.4)
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. For s ∈ VN , define
X̂s :=
{
1 if s ∈ NN ,
0 otherwise,
Xs := X̂s − (1− β)N .
Let τ 2N := Var(|NN |). We first prove that
τ 2N = 2
NbN + 2
NN
(
α(1− β)2N−2 − (1− β)2N), (6.5)
where bN = (1− β)N
(
1− (1− β)N). We note here that X := (Xs)s∈VN is a collection of
identically distributed mean-zero random variables. Moreover, for two vertices s  t, we
know that Xs and Xt are independent, so
τ 2N = 2
NbN + 2
NN Cov(X0, X1)
where 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and 1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0). To compute the covariance above, observe
that
Cov(X0, X1) = Cov(X̂0, X̂1) = E[X̂0X̂1]− (1− β)2N .
The product X̂0X̂1 is nonzero only when both 0 and 1 are PNE, which requires their
payoffs in the first dimension to be equal, giving
Cov(X0, X1) = α(1− β)2N−2 − (1− β)2N .
It is worthwhile noting here that 2NbN/τ
2
N = 1+cN where |cN | decreases to 0 geometrically
fast.
Now let
V := f(X) :=
1
τN
∑
s∈VN
Xs (6.6)
and X˜ := (X˜s)s∈VN be an independent copy of X. Also, for any set A ⊂ VN , let
XA := (X
s
A)s∈VN be such that
XsA :=
{
X˜s, if s ∈ A,
Xs, if s /∈ A. (6.7)
Moreover, define
∆tf(X) := f(X)− f
(
X{t}
)
=
1
τN
(
Xt − X˜t
)
. (6.8)
Hence, for any t /∈ A,
∆tf(XA) = f(XA)− f
(
XA∪{t}
)
=
1
τN
(
Xt − X˜t
)
= ∆tf(X).
Furthermore, let
T s :=
1
2
∑
A⊂(VN\{s})
(
2N
(
2N − 1
|A|
))−1
∆sf(X)∆sf(XA) =
(
Xs − X˜s
)2
2τ 2N
, (6.9)
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and T =
∑
s∈VN T
s. As E[V ] = 0 and Var(V ) = 1, using Chatterjee (2008, Theorem 2.2),
we have
sup
x∈R
|P(V ≤ x)− Φ(x)| ≤ 2
√Var(T ) + 1
2
2N∑
t=1
E
[|∆tf |3]
1/2. (6.10)
Notice that in order to get (6.10) from Chatterjee (2008, Theorem 2.2), we have to
use a simple relation between Kolmogorov’s distance κ, which we use here, and the
Kantorovich-Wasserstein distance ω, which is used in Chatterjee (2008, Theorem 2.2)).
In general, κ ≤ √2ω.
Notice that
E[T s] =
E[(Xs − X˜s)2]
2τ 2N
=
bN
τ 2N
.
Moreover, for any pair of profiles s, t,
T sT t =
(Xs − X˜s)2(Xt − X˜t)2
4τ 4N
.
Hence, for h(s, t) ≥ 2, we have that E[T sT t] = b2Nτ−4N by independence. If, on the other
hand, h(s, t) = 1, then
E[T sT t] = O
(
2−4N(1− β)−2N).
Finally, for s = t,
E[(T s)2] = (1 + cN)2
−Nτ−2N .
Hence
Var(T s) = O(2−Nτ−2N ).
Moreover, if h(s, t) = 1, then
Cov(T s, T t) = O(2−2N).
If h(s, t) ≥ 2, we have that Cov(T s, T t) = 0. Hence,
Var(T ) ≤ 2N Var(T s) + 2NN Cov(T 0, T 1) = O(τ−1N ).
Similarly,
E
[|∆tf |3] ∼ (1− β)N
τ 3N
=
1
2NτN
.
We obtain that there exists a constant K1 such that
sup
x∈R
|P(V ≤ x)− Φ(x)| ≤ K1τ−1/4N .
This implies (3.3), as τ
−1/4
N = O((1 + α)
−N/4). 
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Proofs of Section 5.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Fix any β ∈ (0, 1/2) and let ε > 0. We call the complement
of L βN the fragment of the percolation, i.e., the complement of the largest connected
component. McDiarmid et al. (2018, Theorem 1 a)) states that the cardinality of the
fragment is bounded WVHP by the quantity
hN := (2β)
N + ε
√
N(2β)N/2. (6.11)
We suppose that this bound holds, as the probability that does not hold decays fast to 0
(it is actually summable). Hence, by symmetry, the probability that s /∈ L βN is bounded
above by hN/2
N , which is summable. We extend this to general β by monotonicity. In
fact, it is well known that there exists a coupling such that if β < β′, then L βN ⊂ L β
′
N ,
e.g. see Bolloba´s (2001, Theorem 2.1 page 36). 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. We will actually prove the stronger result that there exists a
coupling such that L sN = L
β,s
N . To this end, we need to define the following objects.
Assume that r, t ∈ VN are neighbors in −→H N and define the event
{r → t} := {−−→[r, t] ∈ −→E N}. (6.12)
Since each player has only two actions, we have that {r → t} is independent of {u→ w}
for every {u→ w} 6= {r → t}.
For any subset U ⊂ VN , we call −−→∆U the set of vertices in U c which are out-neighbors
of some elements in U , that is,
w ∈ −−→∆U iff w ∈ U c and ∃u ∈ U such that {u→ w} is true, (6.13)
and we call ∆U the set of vertices in U c that are neighbors of some elements in HN ,
that is,
w ∈ ∆U iff w ∈ U c and ∃u ∈ U such that u ∼ w. (6.14)
We will prove the result by constructing a suitable coupling between the random ori-
ented N -cube
−→
H N and the percolation graph H
β
N .
We define
P1 = {s} and, for each k ∈ N, Pk+1 = Pk ∪ −−→∆Pk. (6.15)
We then construct a finite sequence of random graphs such that each graph of the
sequence is a bond percolation with parameter β and the last graph in the finite sequence
has the property that we want.
Start with a bond percolation with parameter β, and call the resulting graph B1.
Assume that this percolation is independent of (Zti : i ∈ [N ], t ∈ VN).
For every k ≥ 1 we will update Bk by changing the status of some edges at each stage,
in such a way that Bk+1 is still a bond percolation with parameter β. More precisely, we
define the sequence of random subgraphs (Bk)k∈N of HN recursively as follows. For each
edge e ∈ EN , we define Bk{e} the status (open or closed) of edge e in Bk.
For every k ∈ N, we obtain Bk+1 from Bk, by updating all and only the edges in EN
that connect an element of Pk to an element of ∆Pk. More precisely: for any u ∈Pk
15
and any w ∈ ∆Pk, with u ∼ w,
Bk+1{[u,w]} =
{
open, if {u→ w},
closed, otherwise;
(6.16)
for all other edges e ∈ EN , we have Bk+1{e} = Bk{e}.
Since the status of edges is updated independently of the original configuration and
with i.i.d. Bernoulli(β) random variables, we have that Bk+1 is still a bond percolation
with parameter β.
Notice that, in the worst-case scenario each of these processes explores the whole HN
in 2N iterations. That is Bk+1 = Bk and Pk+1 = Pk for all k ≥ 2N .
By construction, P2N is exactly the set of vertices in the connected component that
contains s, in the percolation graph B2N . In this context, L
s
N = P2N and the set of
vertices in the connected component that contains s, in the percolation graph B2N is
L β,sN . This completes the proof. 
From now on, we set B∗ = B2N , which is an independent bond percolation with
parameter β. In the proof of Proposition 5.2 we build a percolation B∗ that creates a
coupling between L sN and L
β,s
N . In the remaining part of the paper, we will use this
percolation B∗ and in this context the coupling L sN = L
β,s
N will hold.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. For any graph G , call |G | the cardinality of its vertex set. Define
γk := min{# of edges on the boundary of H ⊂ B∗ : |H| = k},
λk := # of subgraphs of B
∗ having k vertices.
(6.17)
The probability of having a connected subgraph H ⊂ B∗ which is disconnected from its
complement, is at most λk2
−γk . Hence, in order to prove that disconnected components
can only be single points, we can follow the strategy in Bolloba´s (2001, page 385), and it
is enough to prove that
2N−1∑
k=2
λk2
−γk = o(1). (6.18)
Eq. (6.18) is proved in Bolloba´s (2001, Lemma 14.4, page 388). Then WHP B∗ is
connected if and only if it contains no disconnected components of size 1, i.e., isolated
vertices. In particular, as Eq. (6.18) holds, then the connected component misses only
the isolated vertices, WHP. In virtue of Proposition 5.3, we have that B∗ contains all
the vertices in VN with the exception of a Poisson(1) number of isolated vertices. This is
because, with WHP the profile s is not an isolated vertex. 
Proofs of Section 4. The following lemma gives a precise description of the geometry
of the percolation graph when β < 1/2, which corresponds to the case α > 0. It states
that there exists a constant mβ, depending on β only, and a δ > 0, such that no ball of
radius δN can contain more than mβ elements not belonging to the largest component,
WVHP.
Lemma 6.1 (McDiarmid et al. (2018, Theorem 2(a))). For any r ∈ N and any s ∈ VN ,
call
Br(s) := {t : h(s, t) ≤ r}, (6.19)
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where h is the Hamming distance defined in Eq. (6.4). Set
mβ :=
⌊
1
− ln(1− β)
⌋
. (6.20)
Then, for any fixed s, there exists δ > 0 such that∑
N
P(∃t : |BδN(t) \L sN | ≥ mβ) <∞.
Remark 6.1. Notice that McDiarmid et al. (2018, Theorem 2(a)) is actually formulated
in terms of largest connected component ofB∗, i.e., L βN instead ofL
s
N . This substitution
holds in virtue of Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. (a) The case α = 0 can be inferred directly from Propositions 5.2
and 5.3. Proposition 5.2 implies that the cluster containing s has the same distribution
as the cluster of profiles accessible for a BRD which starts from s. Hence, in virtue of
Proposition 5.3, WHP, in the percolation B∗, we still use the notation L sN to denote the
largest connected component which contains s. Using Proposition 5.3 we infer that L sN
contains all but a Poisson number of vertices. None of these vertices can be a PNE, as
the edges incident to them are oriented towards their neighbors. This implies that WHP
L sN contains all the PNE, if the game has any.
Next, we turn to the case 0 < α ≤ 1/2. Let TN be the number of vertices that are
incident to at least 2N−mβ unoriented edges. Markov’s inequality yields
P(TN ≥ 1) ≤ 2NαN−mβ . (6.21)
Since α < 1/2, the right-hand side decreases geometrically to 0. Therefore, WVHP no
vertex in VN is incident to more than 2N−mβ unoriented edges. In virtue of Lemma 6.1,
there exists δ > 0 such that WVHP, for any s, any ball BδN(s) contains at most mβ
vertices of M sN , which was defined in Eq. (4.2).
We emphasize that simultaneously all the balls satisfy the property described above
WVHP. Under the event {TN = 0}, which has a very high probability, each element of
M sN ∩BδN(s) is incident to no less than N −mβ unoriented edges. Hence, for each each
t ∈M sN , WVHP there exist at most mβ − 1 other vertices of M sN whose distance from t
is less than δN . Moreover, WVHP each t ∈M sN has an edge oriented towards a vertex of
L sN , and this prevents t from being a PNE. Hence, WVHP no element of M
s
N ∩BδN(s)
can be a PNE.
(b) For this case, we introduce a different percolation H˜N on HN which is defined below.
This percolation is related to B∗. For any pair of vertices r, t ∈ VN , we declare the edge
[r, t] open in H˜N iff
{r → t} ∪ {t→ r} (6.22)
holds true, that is, the edge connecting the two profiles r and t is oriented in
−→
H N . Oth-
erwise the edge [r, t] is declared closed in H˜N . Since the percolation H˜N has parameter
α = 1/2, we are in the framework studied in Erdo˝s and Spencer (1979), and we can apply
Proposition 5.3.
Call L˜ sN the largest connected component of H˜N that contains s. WVHP the set L˜
s
N
contains all vertices of HN except some isolated vertices. Any isolated vertex in H˜N is a
PNE, as it is incident to non-oriented edges only, which in turns imply that each player
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has no incentive to deviate. Therefore, using Proposition 5.3, we have that the number of
PNE outside L˜ sN is stochastically larger than a Poisson(1) random variable. Notice that
L sN ⊂ L˜ sN . This is because any edge that is open in B∗ is also open in H˜N . Hence, the
number of PNE outside L˜ sN is stochastically larger than a Poisson(1) random variable.
(c) For t ∈ VN , define Θt the indicator of the event that the vertex t is incident only to
unoriented edges in
−→
H N and
ΘN =
∑
t∈VN
Θt. (6.23)
Notice that HN is a bipartite graph. We have
VN = V
even
N ∪˙V oddN , (6.24)
where V evenN is the set of vertices for which the sum of coordinates is even and V
odd
N is
the set of vertices for which the sum of coordinates is odd. Edges connect only vertices
from different components, so no pair of vertices in V evenN (or in V
odd
N ) can be neighbors.
Obviously |V evenN | = |V oddN | = 2N−1. Our first goal is to prove the following claim.
Claim 6.2. {Θt : t ∈ V evenN } is a collection of independent events.
Proof. The event Θs depends only on the payoffs at s and at each of its neighbors. It is
enough to prove that, for every subset I ⊂ V evenN , we have
P
(⋂
s∈I
Θs
)
=
∏
s∈I
P(Θs). (6.25)
Fix I and t ∈ I and define I−t := I \ {t}. We need to prove that
P
(⋂
s∈I
Θs
)
= P
Θt ⋂
s∈I−t
Θs
 = P(Θt)P
 ⋂
s∈I−t
Θs
. (6.26)
The set of profiles in I−t that share a neighbor with t has cardinality at most N − 1. If
this set is empty then Eq. (6.25) trivially holds. Otherwise, for i ∈ [N ], let wi, sij ∈ I−t
be such that wi ∼i t and sij ∼j wi, with i 6= j. If, for some i, the event Θsij is true,
then Zs
ij
j ≥ Zwjj , and this event is independent of Zwii . Therefore the class of events
{Θsij}i∈[N ] is independent of the class of random variables {Zw
i
i }i∈[N ]. Since the event
Θt depends only on {Zwii }i∈[N ] and Zti , we have that Θt is independent of {Θs
ij}i∈[N ].
Moreover, Θt is independent of Θs for all s ∈ I−t. This ends the proof of Claim 6.2. 
In turn, Claim 6.2 implies that ΘN is stochastically larger than a Binomial
(
2N−1, αN
)
.
Each vertex t that is incident only to unoriented edges has the following properties:
• It is a PNE.
• It lies in M sN , unless t = s.
Hence, we have that for any fixed K > 0,
lim
N→∞
P(|NN ∩M sN | > K) = 1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We reason by contradiction. BRD does not converge to PNE if
either these equilibria are not accessible or if the BRD gets trapped in a subgraph where no
equilibria are present. The former option is ruled out by the combination of Theorems 3.2
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and 4.3(a). Notice that if BRD gets trapped in a subgraph K where no equilibria are
present, then the number of vertices in this subgraph, which we call a trap, is at least 4,
because HN is bipartite. We have that each edge connecting K to its boundary ∆K
either is undirected or points towards K .
Denote B
∗
the graph obtained by adding to B∗ the edges which have no orientation,
i.e., the ones that correspond to a tie. Call C the graph with vertex set VN and all the
edges in EN which are not in B
∗
. The random graph C is obtained through a percolation
with parameter β < 1/2, as an edge is open if it is closed in B
∗
, which is a percolation.
Notice that the vertices of C are not connected, by definition of this random graph, to
the largest component L sN of B
∗, i.e., using the terminology of McDiarmid et al. (2018),
they are part of the so-called fragment ofB∗. By Lemma 6.1 there exists δ > 0 such that,
WVHP, any δN ball contains at most mβ vertices, where mβ is defined as in Eq. (6.20)).
Notice that, by Eq. (4.3) and Eq. (6.20) we have
mβ =
⌊
1
− ln(1− β)
⌋
=
⌊
− 1
(ln (1/2 + α/2))
⌋
≤ 3.
Hence, the size of K must be less than 4, and this yields a contradiction. 
7. Conclusion and open problems
Large random games have many PNE, as long as the probability of ties α > 0. We
identified the limiting distribution of the number of PNE and their position with respect
the starting point of a BRD. The relevance of our approach is that it creates a link
between different subjects. The next important question is the following. How long does
it take for BRD to reach a PNE? This is equivalent to study the path-length of a non-
backtracking random walk on the percolation cluster of the hypercube. Fig. 5 shows that
the time seems to grow polynomially in N . Notice that Fig. 5 describes the behavior of
a BRD where at each step a player is randomly chosen among those who are willing to
deviate.
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Figure 5. Iterations needed for BRD to reach an NE for α = 0.5, with
100 trials per N .
Next, it is important to study the geometry of PNE when more actions are available,
and the payoffs are weakly dependent.
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8. List of symbols
bN constant defined by (1− β)N
(
1− (1− β)N), introduced in Eq. (6.5)
Br(s) ball of radius r centred at s, introduced in Lemma 6.1
B
∗
the graph obtained by adding to B∗ the edges which have no orientation
Bk percolation process at time k, defined in Eq. (6.16)
B∗ equal to B2N
C the graph with vertex set VN and all the edges in EN which are not in B
∗
EN edge set of HN−→
E N edge set of
−→
H N
f defined in Eq. (6.6)
gi payoff function for player i, introduced in Eq. (2.1)
h Hamming distance on HN
hN a bounding constant, defined in Eq. (6.11)
HN N -cube−→
H N partially oriented hypercube
H βN the random subgraph obtained from HN via β-bond percolation
H˜N percolation process, defined in Eq. (6.22)
I a subset of V evenN , introduced in Eq. (6.25)
I−t equal to I \ {t}, defined in Eq. (6.26)
Kα a constant dependent on α, introduced in Theorem 3.2
K subgraph of HN
L sN set of all vertices in
−→
H N accessible from s, introduced in Eq. (4.2)
L βN largest component of H
β
N
L β,sN largest component of H
β
N containing s
L˜ sN the largest connected component of H˜N that contains s
mβ constant, introduced in Lemma 6.1
M sN set of all vertices in
−→
H N not accessible from s, introduced in Eq. (4.2)
N number of players, introduced in Eq. (2.1)
[N ] set of players, introduced in Eq. (2.1)
NN set of PNE in ΓN , introduced in Definition 2.1
Pk exploration process at time k, defined in Eq. (6.15)
{r → t} event in which −−→[s, t] ∈ −→E , introduced in Eq. (6.12)
s an action profile, introduced after Eq. (2.1)
s−i action profile s for all players except i, introduced after Eq. (2.1)
Si set of actions for player i, introduced in Eq. (2.1)
S set of all possible action profiles, introduced after Eq. (2.1)
[s, t] edge connecting vertices s and t−−→
[s, t] edge [s, t] oriented from s to t
t an action profile, introduced in Eq. (2.4)
T s defined in Eq. (6.9)
T equal to
∑
s∈VN T
s
22
TN number of vertices incident to at least 2N−mβ unoriented vertices, introduced
in Eq. (6.21)
V defined in Eq. (6.6)
VN vertex set of HN
V evenN set of vertices whose sum of coordinates is even, introduced in Eq. (6.24)
V oddN set of vertices whose sum of coordinates is odd, introduced in Eq. (6.24)
W s Bernoulli random variable describing the event in which s is an SPNE,
introduced in Eq. (6.1)
WN total number of SPNE in ΓN
X̂s Bernoulli random variable describing the event in which s is a PNE, intro-
duced in proof of Theorem 3.2
X̂ mean-adjusted X̂s, introduced in proof of Theorem 3.2
X collection (Xs)s∈VN
X˜s an independent copy of Xs
X˜ collection
(
X˜s
)
s∈VN
XsA defined in Eq. (6.7)
Zsi random variable dictating the payoff for player i of action profile s
Z a generic copy of Zsi
α probability of payoffs being equal, introduced in Eq. (3.1)
β probability that one payoff is strictly less than another, introduced in
Eq. (3.1)
γk defined in Eq. (6.17)
ΓN game with N players, introduced in Eq. (2.1)
∆t a difference operator, defined in Eq. (6.8)
∆U set of vertices which are neighbours of vertex set U , introduced in Eq. (6.14)−−→
∆U set of vertices which are out-neighbours of vertex set U , introduced in
Eq. (6.13)
Θt the indicator of the event that the vertex t is incident only to unoriented
edges in
−→
H N , introduced in Eq. (6.23)
ΘN defined in Eq. (6.23)
λk defined in Eq. (6.17)
ΞN the set of all isolated vertices in H
β
N , introduced in Proposition 5.3
τN standard deviation of the number of PNE in ΓN , introduced in Eq. (6.5)
φ density function of a standard normal
Φ cumulative distribution function of a standard normal, introduced in
Eq. (3.2)
0 action profile (0, 0, ..., 0)
1 action profile (1, 0, ..., 0)
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